St. John's Law Review
Volume 82, Fall 2008, Number 4

Article 5

Are KERPs Alive in Essence? The Viability of Executive Incentive
Bonus Plans After 11 U.S.C. § 503(C)(1)
Melissa C. King

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

NOTES
ARE KERPS ALIVE IN ESSENCE? THE
VIABILITY OF EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE
BONUS PLANS AFTER 11 U.S.C. § 503(C)(1)
MELISSA C. KING'

INTRODUCTION

Two hundred and eight CEOs and corporate directors from
twenty-five of the largest corporations to file for bankruptcy in
2001 and 2002 walked away from their failing companies with
gross earnings of $3.3 billion.' Paid handsomely for utter failure,
these "barons of bankruptcy"2 jumped ship with titanic personal
fortunes as their companies foundered or sank. Top offenders
included Gary Winnick of Global Crossing, who "earned" $512
million, Ken Lay, former CEO and Chairman of Enron, who
"earned" $247 million, and Jeff Skilling, former Enron President,
3
who "earned" $89 million.
Contributing in large part to the excessive earnings of these
corporate insiders were all-cash retention bonuses, or Key
I Notes and Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2009, St.
John's University School of Law; B.A., History & International Political Economy,

2006, Fordham University.

I Ien Cheng, Survivors Who Laughed All the Way to the Bank: Barons of
Bankruptcy Part I, FIN. TIMES (London), July 31, 2002, at 10 (surveying 181
executives and twenty-seven directors from the twenty-five largest U.S. public
companies to go bankrupt in 2001 and 2002). The earnings figures for these
executives included salary, bonuses, share sales, and other cash paymentsincluding annual and long-term performance pay-outs, signing and retention
bonuses, severance payments, and forgiven cash loans-paid out between January
1999 and December 2001. Id. The study reported that fifty-two executives and
directors each made more than $10 million, thirty-one more than $25 million,
sixteen more than $50 million, and eight of them topped an astounding $100 million.
Id.
2 Id. (calling these "barons of bankruptcy... a privileged group of top business
people who made extraordinary personal fortunes even as their companies were
heading for disaster").
3 Id.
1509
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4
Employee Retention Plans ("KERPs").
Debtor corporations
utilized KERPs to retain executives and directors whose wisdom
and guidance had steered them into bankruptcy in the first
place.5 KERPs insulated these insiders from the financial risks
facing nearly all employees, creditors, and shareholders in
reorganization.'
The inequity of KERPs, approved by bankruptcy courts and
paid out amidst massive layoffs and record-breaking creditor
claims, garnered intense public scrutiny and congressional
attention.
This attention resulted in newly enacted
11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1), part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
Section
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA").'
503(c)(1) prohibits any "transfer made to, or an obligation
incurred for the benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the
purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's
business."'

4

See Jennifer LeClaire, Bonuses Amid Bankruptcy Draw Ire of Axed Workers,

CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), June 17, 2002, at 14. Debtor corporations paid

out generous retention bonuses to induce key executives to remain. For example, in
December 2001, days before Enron Corporation filed for bankruptcy, the firm paid
more than $100 million in retention bonuses to executives, some of which exceeded
$1 million per person. Kathryn Kranhold & Mitchell Pacelle, About Those Big Enron
Bonuses..., WALL ST. J., June 12, 2002, at C1. Moreover, in April 2002, Enron
received court approval to pay $140 million in retention bonuses to 1,700 executives
and managers. Jeff St. Onge, Bankruptcy Judge OKs WorldCom Bonuses, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 30, 2002, at BO. Also, in December 2001, Polaroid paid
forty-five top executives court-approved KERPs totaling $1.55 million. Polaroid
Withdraws $5 Million Bonus Plan To Retain Executives, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2002,
at B5. In March 2002, Kmart received court approval to pay up to $150 million in
retention bonuses to 9,950 mid-level executives. St. Onge, supra. In October 2002, a
bankruptcy court approved, over the objections of creditors and stockholders, KERPs
for 325 WorldCom executives totaling $25 million. Id.
' There is something obviously unfair about rewarding executives of companies
in bankruptcy with gross retention bonuses as dedicated employees lose their jobs,
benefits, and nest eggs and shareholders lose their investments. See In re U.S.
Airways, Inc., 329 B.R. 793, 797 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) ("All too often [KERPs] have
been used to lavishly reward-at the expense of the creditor body-the very
executives whose bad decisions or lack of foresight were responsible for the debtor's
financial plight.").
6 See id. ("[Elven where external circumstances rather than the executives are
to blame, there is something inherently unseemly in the effort to insulate the
executives from the financial risks all other stakeholders face in the bankruptcy
process.").
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
S11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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Seemingly, § 503(c)(1) has eliminated KERPs. 9
Debtor
corporations, however, are currently attempting to circumvent
§ 503(c)(1)'s prohibition by restructuring and re-characterizing
KERPs as incentive bonus plans. 10 In theory, incentive bonus
plans, unlike KERPs, require executives to reach certain
productivity levels and performance goals before receiving their
bonuses.11 The emergence of incentive bonus plans, therefore,
has raised the issue of whether such plans are essentially "for the
purpose of inducing [an insider] to remain with the debtor's
business,"12 and thereby explicitly prohibited by § 503(c)(1), or
whether incentive bonus plans are only incidentally retentive in
13
effect and thus allowable.
Debtor corporations assert that incentive bonus plans are
not prohibited under § 503(c)(1) because "the purpose" of such
"incentive" plans is not simply to induce executives to remain
with the corporation through reorganization, but rather to
achieve specified challenging productivity goals. United States
trustees, creditors, employees, and shareholders disagree. They
assert that incentive bonus plans, more often than not, have
"terribly low performance thresholds" making them in effect
"merely 'artfully worded creations' that bear no actual distinction
from ordinary retention packages under the prior KERP
standards."'"
Moreover, they assert that-regardless of the
9 In re U.S. Airways, 329 B.R. at 797-98 ("[Section 503(c)(1)] severely limit[ed]
both the circumstances under which.., retention payments [would] be made to
insiders as well as the amount of such payments .. ").
10 Marie Leone, Bankruptcy Pay: Will "Stay"Bonuses Go?, CFO.CoM, Sept. 13,
2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7905100/c_2984364/?f=archives ("A provision in
the new bankruptcy law amendments has companies scurrying to transform
executive retention packages into performance-based incentive pay.").
11 Id. At least most of the time this is the case. See In re Global Homes Prods.,
LLC, 369 B.R. 778, 786-87 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (paying out incentive bonuses even
though productivity levels were not reached).
12 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1).
13 Incentive bonus plans are potentially allowable under the more flexible
standard in § 503(c)(3) or § 363(b). In contrast to the strict prohibition on retention
bonuses set forth in § 503(c)(1), § 503(c)(3) prohibits any "other transfers or
obligations that are outside the ordinary course of business and not justified by the
facts and circumstances of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(3). Similarly, § 363(b)
provides that a "trustee [or debtor in possession], after notice and a hearing, may
use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the
estate." 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000).
14 Karen Lee Turner & Ronald S. Gellert, Dana Hits a Roadblock: Why PostBAPCPA Laws May Impose StricterKERP Standards,3 Andrews Bankr. Litig. Rep.
(West) 2 (Nov. 6, 2006).
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performance level specified-an unavoidable purpose of incentive
bonus plans is to induce the recipient to remain with the
corporation through reorganization and, as such, are prohibited
under § 503(c)(1).
This Note argues that incentive bonus plans, although
violating § 503(c)(1)'s intent to curb excessive executive
compensation in reorganization, are not prohibited by the
statute's language. While incentive bonus plans may have some
incidental retentive effect, "the purpose" of such plans is not to
"induc[e the insider] to remain with the debtor's business. "115
Part I of this Note describes the pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy court
approval process for KERPs, the corporate behavior motivating
BAPCPA's passage, BAPCPA's legislative path, and § 503(c)(1)'s
KERP restrictions. Part II considers the response of debtor
corporations to § 503(c)(1)'s prohibition, namely the creation of
incentive bonus plans, and the arguments for and against this
response. Part III proposes-based on the statute's text, its
legislative history, and bankruptcy court precedent-that while
incentive bonus plans technically remain a viable option for
corporations in reorganization, such plans circumvent the spirit
of the legislation and therefore must be addressed by bankruptcy
courts and, if necessary, Congress. Part III also includes an
outline of how incentive bonus plans might be addressed.

I.

THE PRE-BAPCPA STATE OF AFFAIRS

A.

Nearly Unfettered Approval: KERPs and the Courts
Prior to the passage of BAPCPA, a debtor corporation in
reorganization routinely used KERPs or "pay-to-stay" bonuses to
retain and compensate executives deemed vital to the
corporation's successful Chapter 11 reorganization. 16 While the

15 1 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1).
16 See, e.g., In re Aerovox, Inc., 269

B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001). Debtors

utilized KERPs:
1) to keep the eligible employees, including the Key Employees, in the
Debtors employ; 2) to compensate the eligible employees, including the Key
Employees, for assuming additional administrative and operational
burdens imposed on the Debtor by its Chapter 11 case; and 3) to allow the
eligible employees, including the Key Employees, to use their best efforts to
ensure the maximization of estate assets for the benefits of creditors.
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Bankruptcy Code did not expressly mention KERPs or provide a
method for their implementation, 7 a debtor corporation sought
and attained bankruptcy court approval for KERPs under
sections 363(b) and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section
363(b) provides that a "trustee [or debtor in possession], after
notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate."1 8 Section
105(a) allows a court to "issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
[the Bankruptcy Code]."19 Since KERPs involved a commitment
of the estate assets, specifically cash, outside the ordinary course
of business,2" a debtor corporation sought approval for and the
bankruptcy court approved KERPs after a hearing under the
authority of the above two sections. 2 '
At the required hearing, the bankruptcy court applied the
business judgment rule to determine whether or not to approve a
proposed KERP.22 Under this deferential standard, the decision
of a debtor corporation to enter into a KERP was presumed valid
if the decision was attributable to any rational business purpose
and was fair and reasonable under the facts and circumstances of
the individual case.23 Parties opposing a KERP had the heavy
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). KERPs were considered necessary to
counteract the loss of certain economic protections afforded to key employees in
solvency. Id. at 75-76.
17 In re Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 341 B.R. 405, 410 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
U.S. Airways, Inc., 329 B.R. 793, 797 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) ("The Bankruptcy Code
does not specifically address so-called Key Employee Retention Plans, or KERPs,
whether adopted before the filing of a bankruptcy petition or after.").
'8 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000).
19 Id. § 105(a).

See In re Allied Holdings, Inc., 337 B.R. 716, 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005)
("KERP programs... have become customary uses of estate funds in large business
reorganizations.").
21 In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., No. 02-41729 (REG), 2003 WL 22316543, at
*29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2003) ("Where... the debtor proposes to enter into a
transaction out of the ordinary course that will involve a commitment of the estate's
assets-e.g., its cash-and there are objections, the approval of the Court, after a
hearing, is required.").
22 In re Brooklyn,
341 B.R. at 410 ("The business judgment rule 'is a
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company.'" (quoting In re Adelphia, 2003 WL 22316543,
at *30)).
2
Id. at 410-12; In re Allied Holdings, 337 B.R. at 721; In re U.S. Airways, Inc.,
329 B.R. 793, 797-98 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005); In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 80-81
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2001).
20
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burden of overcoming this presumption of validity. 2The
deferential standard of review relegated the bankruptcy court to
overseer of the judgment of the debtor corporation rather than
primary decision maker.2 5
B.

KERPs Abused

Given the deferential standard of review and the heavy
burden placed upon the challenger to rebut the presumption of
reasonableness and fairness, KERPs were readily abused.
KERPs, in essence, were the court-sanctioned lifeboat, or more
appropriately the yacht, for executives in reorganization. Here
are five examples:
Enron
A few days before Enron filed for bankruptcy in early
December 2001, it paid out more than $100 million in retention
bonuses to top executives, some of which exceeded $1 million per
executive.26 Of the recipients, Ken Lay, former Enron CEO and
Chairman, received $10.6 million, Jeff Skilling, former Enron
President, received $7.5 million, and David Delainey, a former
Enron Energy Services executive, received $4.2 million.2 7 In
sharp contrast, a few days after Enron filed for bankruptcy, each
of the 4,000 Houston employees terminated by the corporation
received only $4,500 before taxes and lost almost their entire
retirement savings.2
In addition to KERPs paid out just prior to bankruptcy,
Enron sought and received bankruptcy court permission in April
2002 to pay as much as $140 million in retention bonuses to
1,700 executives and managers.2 9 Moreover, in a separate
In re Brooklyn, 341 B.R. at 411.
In re Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 80 ([T]he 'bankruptcy court sits as an overseer of
the wisdom with which the bankruptcy estate's property is being managed by the
trustee or debtor-in-possession, and not, as it does in other circumstances, as the
arbiter of disputes between creditors and the estate.'" (quoting Orion Pictures Corp.
v. Showtime Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir.
1993))).
26 Kranhold & Pacelle, supra note 4.
217 David Barboza, Officials Got a Windfall Before Enron's Collapse, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2002, at C1.
28 Nancy Rivera Brooks, Enron Execs Were Paid To Remain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2001, at 3; Barnaby J. Feder, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Executives, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2002, at C3 ("Enron['s] ...laid-off workers were receiving two weeks'
pay.").
29 St. Onge, supra note 4.
24
25
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transaction in October 2002, Enron paid five top executives at
Portland General Electric $975,000 in retention bonuses, and
was scheduled to award them another $975,000 in June 2003.30
Although paid to remain, a number of executives who
received retention bonuses were no longer with Enron as early as
June 2002. Many retention bonus recipients apparently failed
even to stay with the company for the ninety days required by
their KERP agreements. 3' For example, Mark Haedicke, general
counsel to Enron's wholesale unit, who received $750,000 in
retention bonuses, left Enron in the midst of its reorganization to
Similarly, John
work as a lawyer with UBS Warburg.3 2
Lavorato, a top Enron manager who received $5 million in
retention bonuses, left Enron to work for UBS as a top trader.3 3
WorldCom
In July 2002, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy, owing
creditors more than $41 billion.3 4 In 2000, prior to filing for
bankruptcy, WorldCom paid 558 top executives approximately
$237 million in retention bonuses, averaging out to nearly
$425,000 per executive with some bonuses topping out at well
over $1 million. 5 As part of this plan, Bernard J. Ebbers, former
CEO of WorldCom, received a $10 million bonus and a severance
package, which included a $1.5 million annual payment for life,
use of a company plane for thirty hours a year and medical
insurance.36
In addition to retention bonuses paid out prior to
bankruptcy, in October 2002, WorldCom sought and won, over
the objections of creditors, shareholders, and employees,
bankruptcy court approval to pay $25 million in bonuses to 325
executives.3 ' Executives covered under the plan received bonus
payments in three installments equal to 35%-65% of their
annual salaries, or about $20,000 to $125,000 per person.38

30 Gail Kinsey Hill, Five Top PGE Executives Receive Retention Bonuses from
Enron, OREGONIAN, Apr. 29, 2003, at A01.
31 Kranhold & Pacelle, supra note 4.
32 Id.
33 Id.

34 St. Onge, supra note 4.

35 Feder, supra note 28.
36

Id.

31 St. Onge, supra note 4.
38 Id.
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Kmart
Kmart filed for bankruptcy in February 2002. In March
2002, Kmart sought and won bankruptcy court approval to pay
up to $150 million in bonuses to persuade executives to remain
with the retailer through bankruptcy, 39 including a $6.5 million
bonus to Chuck Conaway, Kmart's former CEO.40 Even while
deep in bankruptcy, "Kmart exec[utives
were] still living large
41
handsomely."
paid
and getting
Polaroid
After filing for bankruptcy in October 2001, Polaroid made a
court-approved deal with creditors in December 2001 to pay out
$1.55 million in retention bonuses to forty-five executives.4 2 In
"contrast, just days before Polaroid filed for bankruptcy, it
canceled health and life insurance for more than 6,000 retirees,
and canceled health insurance coverage for workers on long term
disability. It also [terminated] severance benefits for thousands
43
of workers who were recently laid off."
In addition, in April 2002, a bankruptcy court approved the
payment of $4.5 million in retention bonuses to forty executives.4 4
The retention bonuses for the CFO, William Flaherty, and Senior
Vice President, Neal Goldman, totaled 62.5% of their annual base

39 Id.

Companies Crash, but CEOs Cash In, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 3, 2002, at El.
Conaway was also previously the recipient of a $4.3 million retention bonus in 2000
and a $2 million retention bonus in 2001. Cheng, supra note 1. He also received,
upon resignation, a $5 million retention loan from the company. Nelson D. Schwartz,
Greed-Mart, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 2002, at 139. Moreover, before he resigned Conaway
handed out $30 million in retention loans to twenty-five top executives. Id.
4" Schwartz, supra note 40 ("[Elven if Kmart [went] down, [CEO James]
Adamson [would] still walk away with a shopping cart full of cash."). Adamson
received a $2.5 million inducement payment to become Kmart's CEO. Id. In
addition, his annual salary was $1.5 million, and his guaranteed contractual perks
included a "weekly private plane service between his residences in Detroit, New
York, and Florida; a car and driver in Michigan and New York; and temporary
accommodations at the swanky Townsend Hotel near Kmart headquarters. A
standard room there costs $320 a night." Id.
42 Polaroid Withdraws $5 Million Bonus Plan To Retain Executives, supra note
4.
4 Press Release, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Senator Edward M. Kennedy Fights
To Protect Americans from a Flawed Bankruptcy Bill (Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter
Kennedy
Press
Release
I],
available at
http://kennedy.senate.gov/
newsroom/press release.cfm?id=0882831e-e21e-414c-8f78-70b2ff685f06.
44 PolaroidBonuses OK'd, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2002, at C1.
40
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salaries, and the bonuses for the remaining thirty-eight
executives were equal to about 25% of their base salaries.45
Global Crossing
After losing almost 90% of its stock market value during
2001, Global Crossing filed for bankruptcy in January 2002.46 In
April 2002, Global Crossing sought court approval to spend $15
million to retain 300 executives4 7 while "[mlany workers' 401(k)
retirement savings plans, loaded with company shares, became
nearly worthless as the stock price sank.""
Moreover,
immediately after it declared bankruptcy, Global Crossing
stopped severance payments to previously laid-off workers.4 9
C.

Congress Reacts
Despite highly publicized and egregious KERP payments,
Congress did not immediately respond.
BAPCPA, as first
introduced in the Senate by Senator Grassley (R-IA) and as
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee for approval, did not
include § 503(c) or any other similar provision addressing
KERPs.5 ° The bill's failure to address KERPs was brought to the
attention of Congress during the Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings by Dave McCall, Director of the United Steel Workers of
America, AFL-CIO. 5 Highlighting the bill's failure to address
the problem of corporate abuse in bankruptcy generally and

45 Id.

Companies Crash, but CEOs Cash In, supra note 40.
Leon Lazaroff, Global Seeks $15M for Retention Bonuses, DAILY DEAL (New
York), Apr. 12, 2002. "The proposed retention plan would provide $10 million to
about 300 employees and set aside $5 million for a discretionary fund for employees
deemed essential to the company's reorganization efforts. According to the filing, the
company's chief executive, John Legere, would oversee the discretionary fund." Id.
Companies Crash, but CEOs Cash In, supra note 40. In the summer of 2001,
James Welch, a fifty-five-year-old switching technician, held 6,200 Global Crossing
shares in his 401(k), valued at about $190,000. By March 2002, the value had
plummeted to $336. Id.
46

47

49 Id.

50 See S. 256, 109th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, Feb. 1, 2005). In fact,
only a small section of the original bill, beginning on page 495 of the 501-page
document, in any way addressed the topic of corporate abuse in bankruptcy. See
Bankruptcy Revision: Hearing Before the Comm. on Sen. Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Dave McCall, Director, United Steel
Workers of America, AFL-CIO).
51 Hearing, supra note 50 (statement of Dave McCall, Director, United Steel
Workers of America, AFL-CIO).
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KERPs specifically, McCall called upon Congress to address,
what he labeled, "notorious 'KERPs.' "52
Heeding this call, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA)
introduced § 503(c)58 as an amendment to BAPCPA. Senator
Kennedy, in a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
52 Id.
McCall identified KERPs as "'golden parachutes' payable to the
executives of a reorganizing company... rewarding them handsomely often after
they have cut workers' pay, reduced or eliminated retiree benefits, shuttered plants,
and sold them off." Id. He expressly called upon Congress to regulate KERP excess,
noting that "[wihen workers learn of a KERP... it puts our bankruptcy system in a
bad light and often makes the difficult bargaining choices required in bankruptcy
even harder to achieve." Id.
' 11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Section 503(c) states:
Notwithstanding subsection (b), there shall neither be allowed, nor paid(1) a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the benefit of, an
insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to remain
with the debtor's business, absent a finding by the court based on evidence
in the record that(A) the transfer or obligation is essential to retention of the person
because the individual has a bona fide job offer from another business
at the same or greater rate of compensation;
(B) the services provided by the person are essential to the survival of
the business; and
(C) either(i) the amount of the transfer made to, or obligation incurred for
the benefit of, the person is not greater than an amount equal to
10 times the amount of the mean transfer or obligation of a
similar kind given to nonmanagement employees for any purpose
during the calendar year in which the transfer is made or the
obligation is incurred; or
(ii) if no such similar transfers were made to, or obligations were
incurred for the benefit of, such nonmanagement employees
during such calendar year, the amount of the transfer or
obligation is not greater than an amount equal to 25 percent of
the amount of any similar transfer or obligation made to or
incurred for the benefit of such insider for any purpose during the
calendar year before the year in which such transfer is made or
obligation is incurred;
(2) a severance payment to an insider of the debtor, unless(A) the payment is part of a program that is generally applicable to all
full-time employees; and
(B) the amount of the payment is not greater than 10 times the
amount of the mean severance pay given to nonmanagement
employees during the calendar year in which the payment is made; or
(3) other transfers or obligations that are outside the ordinary course of
business and not justified by the facts and circumstances of the case,
including transfers made to, or obligations incurred for the benefit of,
officers, managers, or consultants hired after the date of the filing of the
petition.
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declared, "[i]f we're going to pass a bankruptcy bill, let's pass a
real one .... [Let's pass a] bill that cracks down on corporate
executives who loot their companies at the expense of workers,
retirees, creditors, and stockholders. "
The language of § 503(c) is recycled. The exact language5 5
first appeared as section 104 of the proposed Employee Abuse
Prevention Act of 2002, introduced in the Senate by Senator
Richard Durbin (D-IL), co-sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy
(D-VT), Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Senator John Kerry
(D-MA), and Senator John D. Rockefeller (D-WV) and introduced
56
in the House by Congressman William Delahunt (D-MA).
Although never passed, the Employee Abuse Prevention Act of
2002 sought, among other things, to amend the Bankruptcy Code
to limit retention bonuses and severance pay made for the benefit
of an insider of the debtor57 and to "empower[] bankruptcy judges
and trustees to scrutinize and set aside transactions that strip
companies of their assets and plunge them into bankruptcy."58
The Senate Judiciary Committee adopted § 503(c) without
recorded opposition and included it in the revised version of the
BAPCPA bill sent to the Senate and House for ratification.
Opposition to § 503(c), however, surfaced in both the Senate and
House debates on the bill. Opponents voiced concern that the
broad-brush language of § 503(c)(1) would not effectively address
the problem and would prevent the responsible along with the
irresponsible use of KERPs in Chapter 11 reorganization
proceedings. As Senator Hatch stated on the Senate floor,
[Senator] Kennedy[] seeks to prevent unfair and unnecessary
retention bonuses to insiders in Chapter 11 companies. The
goal here is certainly laudable and I agree with the desire to try
to do that, but it has come to light since our markup that this
54 Kennedy

Press Release I, supra note 43.
55Only a slight structural dissimilarity exists between § 104(c) as proposed in
2002 and § 503(c) as adopted in 2005. As proposed in 2002, the language included
within the current § 503(c)(3) was divided between two paragraphs. See S. 2798,
107th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, July 25, 2002).
56 See id.; H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (as introduced in the House, July 25, 2002).
", See S. 2798.

'8Rep. William Delahunt, Statement of the Honorable William D. Delahunt of
Massachusetts Regarding the Introduction of the Employee Abuse Prevention Act of
2002 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/delahunt/EAPA.shtml
(stating that the bill "enables courts to recover excessive retention bonuses" and "to
hold corporate officeholders to the same standard of responsibility and
accountability they have been preaching to people of more modest means").
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companies undergoing reorganization... from keeping key
employees59 who may best be able to steer the company back into
solvency.
Congressman Chris Cannon reiterated a similar concern in
the House debate on the bill:
It is very important that a Chapter 11 debtor be able to retain
management that is dedicated to maintaining the company's
value for the benefit of its creditors, investors, employees, and
other stakeholders ....

[Section 503(c)] should not be applied to

invalidate such programs where there is no evidence of insider
negligence, mismanagement, or fraudulent conduct contributed
to a company's insolvency-in whole or in part.6 °
Concern about § 503(c)(1)'s blanket restriction on KERPs
was not limited to Congress.
In a letter read into the
Congressional Record on March 9, 2005, by Senator Hatch, the
Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors wrote: "It
is apparent that the Kennedy amendment is designed to prevent
abuses of the system ....

Unfortunately, [§ 503(c)(1)] goes too far

and should be amended so as not to unnecessarily limit the
bankruptcy court's ability to determine what is in the best
interest of each individual bankruptcy estate."6 '
In an attempt to remedy the perceived deficiency of § 503(c),
Senator Hatch proposed limiting § 503(c)(1)'s restriction to
"payments where 'misconduct, fraud, or mismanagement' [were]
present."62 Such modifications, however, were not adopted or
included in the final version of the bill approved by Congress and
signed into law by President George W. Bush on April 20, 2005.

59 151 CONG. REC. S2340 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch), 151
Cong Rec S 2306, at *S2340 (LEXIS).
ro 151 CONG. REC. H2050-51 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Cannon), 151 Cong Rec H 1993, at *2050-51 (LEXIS).
61 151 CONG. REC. S2341 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch), 151
Cong Rec S 2306, at *S2341 (LEXIS).
62

Id.
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THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

A.

Section 503(c)(1) Closed One Door but Opened Another
For all practical purposes § 503(c)(1) has eliminated KERPs
as a viable option for debtors in reorganization.63 Section
503(c)(1) prohibits the payment of sums to an insider "for the
purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's
business "64 through reorganization, unless the debtor can
demonstrate (1) that such payment is "essential to retention"
because that person "has a bona fide job offer from another
business at the same or greater rate of compensation"; 61 (2) that
the services provided by the individual "are essential to the
survival of the business"I; 66 and (3) that the payment is either
"not greater than an amount equal to 10 times the amount" of a
retention bonus paid to non-management employees, or, if no
such transfer was made to non-management, "is not greater than
an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount" of a similar
retention bonus paid to the executive during the previous year.67
While technically a KERP is permissible if the above three
requirements are satisfied, fulfilling such requirements is an
onerous, if not impossible, task.6 Thus, in effect, § 503(c)(1) is a
blanket prohibition on KERPs.

6

See Turner & Gellert, supra note 14 ("[It seems safe to assume that, for all
practical purposes, the 'retention bonus' notion has been effectively eradicated under
the Bankruptcy Code.").
11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
Id. § 503(c)(1)(A). To satisfy this requirement, top executives would be
required to search for and secure a bona fide job offer, resulting in lost productivity
for the bankrupt company and ultimately, more often than not, in the executive
leaving to go to the viable company that has offered him or her the same or greater
compensation. See In re Dana Corp., 358 B.R. 567, 575 n.11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Moreover, the debtor corporation would be required to prove in court that the
executive will take the alternate job offer without a KERP to induce him or her to
stay. See id. This "nears absurdity" because "[iut raises the question, Who would ever
agree to remain with a sinking ship when a solvent company has made a competing
job offer?" Turner & Gellert, supra note 14.
1 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1)(B). However, for a debtor in reorganization, the goal is
not survival, but value maximization. See In re Dana, 358 B.R. at 575 n.11.
Therefore, even if the debtor can prove that the corporation will be unable to
maximize its value without the executive, it must nonetheless satisfy the more
rigorous, but far less meaningful, requirement of proving that the corporation cannot
survive without the executive in order to get court approval for a KERP. See id.
67 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1)(C).
6 See In re Dana, 358 B.R. at 575 n.ll; Turner & Gellert, supra note 14 ("[It is
highly unlikely any debtor would ever propose a plan under this section, let alone
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In an attempt to circumvent § 503(c)(1)'s prohibition, debtor
corporations are restructuring and re-characterizing KERPs as
incentive bonus plans. Incentive bonus plans require executives
to reach certain productivity levels and performance goals before
receiving their bonuses. The emergence of such plans has raised
the issue of whether incentive bonus plans are merely recast
KERPs essentially "for the purpose of inducing [an insider] to
remain with the debtor's business" 69 and therefore prohibited
under § 503(c)(1), or whether incentive bonus plans are only
incidentally retentive and therefore not restricted by § 503(c)(1).7°
B.

Competing Claims-ArgumentsFor and Against Allowing
Incentive Bonus Plans Under § 503(c)(1)

Debtor corporations assert that incentive bonus plans, which
are primarily incentivizing and only incidentally retentive, are
not prohibited under § 503(c)(1). Section 503(c)(1), they argue,
must be read narrowly to foreclose only payments made to
executives for the sole or primary purpose of inducing them to
remain with the corporation71 and cannot be read to "prohibit
compensation programs that reward executives for superior
performance or that incorporate specific short-term and longterm performance metrics."7 2 A broad reading of § 503(c)(1)'s
prohibition, they argue, would effectively take away their ability
to compensate executives in reorganization altogether because a
basic purpose of all compensation, including salaries, bonuses,
and benefits, is to encourage executives to come back to work

meet its standards."). Moreover, even if the debtor has satisfactorily demonstrated
all of the above, the amount of the proposed KERP is severely limited. See
11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1)(C).
69 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1).
70 See In re Dana, 358 B.R. at 576.
71 See Omnibus Reply to Objections to Motion of Debtor Dana Corporation,
Pursuant to Sections 363, 365, and 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, for an Order
Authorizing Dana Corporation to Enter into Employment Agreements with Michael
J. Bums, its President and Chief Executive Officer, and Five Key Executives of his
Core Management Team at 21, In re Dana, 358 B.R. at 576 (No. 06-10354)
[hereinafter Omnibus Reply to Objections to Motion of Debtor Dana Corporation].
7 Id. at 19, 21 ("[Dlebtors maintain the right to establish, or continue, incentive
compensation programs that tie executive pay to the accomplishment of corporate
goals.").
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each day. This, they assert, would be both an absurd and
dangerous result.73
argue
that keeping
Moreover,
debtor corporations
knowledgeable executives on board during reorganization is
Executives have
critical to the success of reorganization.
essential knowledge and business skills, including institutional
familiarity and client contacts, which are invaluable in
reorganization. Because such skills are extremely valuable to
viable corporations in the open market, to remain competitive
debtor corporations assert that they must retain the means to
compensate executives at a comparable and attractive level to
counteract the lack of financial and job security inherent in
reorganization.7 4
Furthermore, debtor corporations argue that "[bly grafting
insider-targeted, goal-driven payments onto an incentive plan
and excising the tenure-based 'retention' requirement that
traditionally has been the cornerstone of a" KERP,75 an incentive
bonus plan is a completely transformed approach to executive
compensation.
Incentive bonus plans seek to "include
measurable and identifiable milestones based on challenging but
achievable financial, operational, or procedural benchmarks,"7 6
and therefore are fundamentally different than KERPs and
allowable under § 503(c)(1).
United States trustees, creditors, shareholders, and
employees, on the other hand, strongly disagree. They assert
that incentive bonus plans are nothing more than repackaged
retention plans and, as such, are expressly prohibited under
§ 503(c)(1). They argue that incentive bonus plans, although
labeled "incentivizing," have terribly low performance thresholds
73 Id. at 20 (finding that reading § 503(c)(1) as prohibiting all such compensation
would lead to the absurd result of not paying executives at all).
14 See Debtors' Motion for an Order Authorizing the Implementation of the
Calpine Incentive Program at 5, In re Calpine Corp., No. 05-60200 (BRL), 2008
Bankr. LEXIS 2152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 6, 2006) ("Preserving and enhancing
the value of the [diebtors' estates depends on maintaining the focus, morale and
loyalty of [executives] through the provision of market-competitive compensation.").
7' Ronald F. Greenspan & Matthew Pakkala, KERPs Are Out, but
Incentives Are In: Insider Retention Under BAPCPA, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Aug. 2006,
at 1, available at http://www.fticonsulting.com/media/1642/KERPsAreOutBut_
IncentivesAreIn.pdf.
76 Id. ("Examples [of benchmarks] include targets based on earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA); cash-flow reductions;
process improvements; asset sales; and successful plan confirmation.").
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and fanciful productivity goals"7 and therefore "exhibit[1 all of the

evils that... [§ 503(c)] of the Bankruptcy Code w[as] intended to
eradicate."78
Moreover, United States trustees, creditors, shareholders,
and employees assert that regardless of the performance level
specified, incentive bonus plans are categorically prohibited
under § 503(c)(1).
Advocating an expansive reading of
§ 503(c)(1), these groups assert that incentive bonus plans are
prohibited, because a purpose of such plans is to induce
executives to remain.
Furthermore, as a matter of policy, United States trustees,
creditors, shareholders, and employees argue that when
Congress amended BAPCPA to include § 503(c)(1), Congress
intended to prevent corporate abuse in bankruptcy, specifically to
prevent excessive executive compensation in reorganization.79
Incentive bonus plans circumvent this spirit of and intent behind
§ 503(c)(1) by providing debtor corporations with an unchecked
avenue by which to induce executives to remain. Therefore, to
stay true to Congress' legislative intent, they argue, § 503(c)(1)
must be read to prohibit incentive bonus plans, the latest
corporate creation to effectuate executive excesses.
III. ARE

INCENTiVE BONUS PLANS ALLOWABLE UNDER

§ 503(C)(1)?
While conceived as a broad remedy to corporate abuse in
bankruptcy, specifically excessive executive compensation, as
written § 503(c)(1) is only a narrow fix to a specific problem-the
payment of bonuses to reward executives exclusively for
remaining with a corporation during reorganization. As a
consequence, incentive bonus plans, which are not exclusively for
the purpose of inducing an executive to remain with the
" See Objection of the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders with
Respect to Debtors' Motion for an Order Authorizing Dana Corporation to (A) Enter
into Employment Agreements with Michael J. Burns, its President and CEO, and
Five Key Executives of his Core Management Team, and (B) Assume Certain
Change of Control Agreements, as Amended at 3, In re Dana Corp., 351 B.R. 96
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 06-10354) ("[Tjhe enterprise value milestones for
payment of the 'incentive' portion of the Completion Bonus, if approved, would
reward the [e]xecutives for preserving the [diebtors' current mediocre financial
performance.").
78 Id. at 2.

7 See supra Part I.C.
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corporation through reorganization, do not fall within
§ 503(c)(1)'s express statutory prohibition and therefore are not
prohibited.
Executive compensation plans simply labeled "incentive
bonus plans," however, are not allowed under § 503(c)(1). Section
503(c)(1) expressly prohibits payments "for the purpose of
inducing... [an insider] to remain";" ° therefore, if an incentive
bonus plan sets forth no performance goals or negligible
productivity levels, it is-despite its label-nothing more than a
retention payment and as such is prohibited under the statutory
language of § 503(c)(1). Only transfers which are truly primarily
incentivizing and only coincidently retentive therefore remain
viable under § 503(c)(1).
Although not prohibited by the current statutory language of
§ 503(c)(1), incentive bonus plans, developed to side-step
§ 503(c)(1)'s restrictions, violate the spirit of and intent behind
BAPCPA-to curb corporate abuse in bankruptcy. Incentive
bonus plans, like KERPs, can be readily abused if left
unmonitored. The bankruptcy courts and Congress must be
cognizant of abuses and address incentive bonus plans with an
eye towards balancing the need to prevent abuses with the need
to fairly compensate executives in reorganization.
A.

Statutory Language

Whether incentive bonuses are subject to the limitations of
§ 503(c)(1) turns, in large part, on the statutory meaning of
§ 503(c)(1)'s language, specifically the phrase "transfers
made... for the purpose of inducing [insiders] to remain with the
debtor's business."8 1
Two alternative interpretations are
advanced.
The first broadly construes the phrase "for the
purpose of' to mean "for a purpose" or "for one purpose." Under
this interpretation, since "a" or "one" purpose of an incentive plan
is to retain key executives, the plan is subject to the § 503(c)(1)
restriction.
The second possible interpretation narrowly
construes the phrase "for the purpose of' to mean "for the sole
purpose" or "for the primary purpose." Under this interpretation,
since the "sole" or "primary" purpose of an incentive plan is not to
retain key executives, but is rather to reward them for achieving
80

11

81

Id.

U.S.C. § 503(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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not. nrnhibie

under

§ 503(c)(1).
When interpreting a statute, a court must "begin with the
understanding that Congress 'says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there.' ",82 "When a statute's
language is clear, [a court's] only role is to enforce that language
according to its terms. '" s3 The court is not free to apply the
statute the way it thinks Congress wanted to write it; it must
apply the statute the way it was written. When interpreting the
written text, "[iit is a cardinal principle of statutory construction
that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it
can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant." 4 In other words, "[iut is [a
court's] duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word
of a statute.' ",5 Moreover, as a general rule "[u]nless otherwise
defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance
86
with their ordinary meaning."
The word choice, punctuation placement, and phrase
construction therefore all illuminate the statute's meaning. In
this case, the article "the" is particularly significant. "[I]t is a
rule of law well established that the definite article 'the'
particularizes the subject which it precedes. It is a word of
limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of 'a'
or 'an.' "987 By preceding the word "purpose" in § 503(c)(1) with
the definite article "the" as opposed to the general article "a," the
statute is narrowed to restrict only transfers made for the
specific purpose of "inducing [an insider] to remain with the
82 Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
(2000) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
1 Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)
("[A court's] inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text
is unambiguous.").
14 TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
85 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting Inhabitants
of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)).
86 BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 638, 643 (2006).
87 Am. Bus Ass'n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Brooks v.

Zabka, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (Colo. 1969) (en banc)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1647 (4th ed. 1968) ("The [is a]n article which particularizes the subject spoken of.");
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1221 (10th ed. 1997) ("The... [is]
used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a
unique or a particular member of its class ....").
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debtor's business.""8 Congress' use of the definite article "the"
particularizes and limits the § 503(c)(1) restriction to retention
payments only.8 9 Transfers which are primarily incentivizing
and only coincidently retentive, therefore, are not prohibited by
the language of § 503(c)(1).
B.

Statutory Intent and Purpose
Though the statutory language is narrow, the intent of
Congress in enacting the statute was broad. As its name
suggests, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act was intended to deal with "people who abuse
8

11 U.S.C. §

503(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).

89 Undertaking a similar interpretative approach, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in American Bus Ass'n v. Slater,

reversed
the
district
court's
determination
that the language
of
42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1), the enforcement provision of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, was broad enough to authorize the Department of Transportation to
impose money damages against non-compliant bus companies. See Slater, 231 F.3d
at 2. Section 12188(a)(1) provides that
[t]he remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000a-3(a) of this title
are the remedies and procedures this subchapter provides to any person
who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of this subchapter or who has reasonable grounds for believing
that such person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation of
section 12183 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
In overturning the district court's broad interpretation of the statutory language, the
Circuit Court held that "[b]y preceding the words 'remedies and procedures' with the
definite article 'the,' as opposed to the more general 'a' or 'an,' Congress made clear
that it understood § 2000a-3(a)'s remedies to be exclusive." Slater, 231 F.3d at 4.
"The ADA's carefully crafted remedies scheme reveals the legislature's intent that
the statute's enumerated remedies were to be exclusive, and consequent intent to
deny agencies the power to authorize supplementary monetary relief." Id.
Utilizing an analogous interpretive method, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion
in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), reached a
similar conclusion regarding the impact of the definite article "the" on the meaning
of the Appointments Clause. The Appointments Clause provides that "Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). In reviewing the statutory language, Justice
Scalia concluded that
[t]he Clause does not refer generally to "Bodies exercising judicial
Functions," or even to "Courts" generally, or even to "Courts of Law"
generally. It refers to "the Courts of Law." Certainly this does not mean any
"Cour[t] of Law" (the Supreme Court of Rhode Island would not do). The
definite article "the" obviously narrows the class of eligible "Courts of
Law"....
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 902.
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the... bankruptcy system... [specifically] with the truly
incredible abuses .. . seen in the Enron case, in the Woridcom
case, in the Adelphia case and the Polaroid case."90 It is clear
from Senator Kennedy's statements introducing § 503(c)(1) that
he intended the section to address the issue of corporate
abuse in bankruptcy, specifically, "[clorporate fraud and
mismanagement [that] have forced many companies into
bankruptcy,... [e]xecutives [who have] lined their own pockets
[while] the employees and pensioners were left twisting in the
wind [and] the real abuse by formerly wealthy bankrupts who
game the system."9 '
While Congress set out to write BAPCPA mindful of the
"corporate mismanagement and fraud [that] ha[d] become a way
of life in the highest echelons of corporate America,"92 the broad
and laudable intention to curb corporate abuse in bankruptcy did
not translate into an effective far-reaching statutory solution;
rather, it translated into the narrow KERP restrictions of
§ 503(c)(1).' 3
The narrow language of § 503(c)(1) cannot be
expanded sua sponte to bring about Congress' broad intentions.
Stretching the clearly narrow text of the statute to cover all
transfers with a merely incidental retentive effect, without clear
congressional direction, would lead to unintended and
undesirable results-prohibiting all transfers to all insiders in
the course of reorganization, including wages, health insurance
coverage, bonuses, and pension plans.

90 Press Release, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Statement of Senator Edward M.

Kennedy on the Bankruptcy Bill (Mar. 1 2005) [hereinafter Kennedy Press Release
II], available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/newsroom/statement.cfm?id=23fddd9741c4-4265-92d7-fc3262a8f0c7. As Senator Durbin stated on the Senate floor,
"[w]ouldn't one think in a bankruptcy bill we would go after some of these corporate
bankrupt cheaters? Wouldn't one think we would go after these CEOs and officers
who got hundreds of millions of dollars from these corporations[?] ... It is time we
went after those Enron cheaters." 151 CONG. REC. S1818-01 (2005) (statement of
Sen. Durbin), 2005 WL 473772.
91 Kennedy Press Release I, supra note 43.
92 Kennedy Press Release II, supra note 90.
" ,As usual, Congress used a meat cleaver for delicate surgery, resulting in
foreseeable consequences-i.e. clever lawyers finding ways through the new
legislation." THOMAS J. SALERNO, AM. BANKR. INST., COMP AND BONUS ISSUES
UNDER THE NEW CODE, INCLUDING PENSION BENEFITS AND UNION CONTRACTS

(2006), available at 060907 ABI-CLE 31 (West).
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C. Bankruptcy Court Precedent
In the limited instances where the bankruptcy courts have
addressed the scope of § 503(c)(1), their holdings reflect a narrow
reading of the statute. The bankruptcy courts generally agree
that incentive bonus plans have merely incidental retentive
effects and are therefore not prohibited under § 503(c)(1).
In re Dana CorporationP4
On March 3, 2006, the debtor, Dana Corporation,9 5 filed a
voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.9 6 As part of its
reorganization plan, Dana sought approval for an incentivizing
The
compensation plan for its CEO and five executives.97
proposed plan included both "Annual Incentive Bonuses"
98
conditioned on the company's short-term financial performance
and "Target Completion Bonuses," which included both a fixed
bonus, 99 payable in cash without regard to performance or
creditor recovery as long as the executives remained with the
company, and an uncapped variable bonus based on the Total
Enterprise Value10 0 of the company at the start of reorganization
and six months after that date. 10 '
The Creditors' Committee and the United Steel, Paper and
Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
Service Workers International Union objected to Dana's plan,
asserting that the plan was a KERP prohibited under
§ 503(c)(1). °2 Upon review of the plan, the bankruptcy court
agreed. Judge Lifland held that without tying the fixed

351 B.R. 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
9 Dana Corporation is one of the "leading suppliers of modules, systems and
components for original equipment manufacturers and service customers in the
light, commercial and off-highway vehicle markets." Id. at 98.
96 Id.
97 Id.

98 Id. at 99. The annual incentive bonuses proposed for the five executives
ranged from $336,000 to $528,000. Id. The annual incentive bonus proposed for the
CEO was $2.07 million. Id.
9 The fixed bonuses proposed ranged from $400,000 to $560,000 for each of the
five executives and $3.1 million for the CEO. Id.
100Under this component, the CEO would earn $6.2 million if the debtor's total
enterprise value remained at $2.6 billion and would earn $4.133 million if the
debtor's total enterprise value went down to $2 billion. Id. This bonus was payable in
common stock of the reorganized Dana as long as the stock was listed and readily
tradeable, or else the amounts were payable in cash. Id. at 99-100.
101 Id.
102

Id. at 98.
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completion bonus to something other than the executive
remaining with the debtor until its emergence from
reorganization, the plan could not be categorized as an incentive
bonus and was nothing more than a KERP prohibited under
§ 503(c)(1). 10 3
Judge Lifland, however, qualified his holding. He asserted
that in so holding he did "not find that incentivizing plans which
may have some components that arguably have a retentive effect,
necessarily violate section 503(c)'s requirements."1 °4 In other
words, Judge Lifland narrowly interpreted § 503(c)(1)'s
prohibition as extending to those payments, such as the fixed
completion bonus, whose sole purpose, although not labeled as
such, was retention, but not as extending to primarily
incentivizing bonus plans contingent on the attainment of
performance levels that nonetheless have "some" retentive effect.
In re Dana CorporationH1 °5
On Dana's second go-round before Judge Lifland, it proposed
and sought approval for a reformulated executive compensation
plan. The reformulated plan replaced the problematic retentive
Target Completion Bonuses discussed above with a "Long-Term
The LTIP
Performance Based Incentive Plan" ("LTIP"). 10 6
conditioned the executives' receipt of bonuses on the attainment
of certain "Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation,
°7
Thus
Amortization and Restructuring Costs" ("EBITDAR").
10 8
under the LTIP, there were no guaranteed payments.

103 Id.
at 102 n.3 ("If it walks like a duck (KERP) and quacks like a duck
(KERP), it's a duck (KERP).").
104 Id. at 103 ("While it may be possible to formulate a compensation package
that passes muster under the section 363 business judgment rule or section 503(c)
limitations, or both, this set of packages does neither.").
100358 B.R. 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
106 Id.
at 570.
107 Id.
at 574. In order for the CEO to qualify for the minimum LTIP of $3
million, the company had to achieve a 2007 EBITDAR of $250 million. Id. For each
$100 million increase in EBITDAR, the CEO would receive an additional $750,000,
with a maximum payout of $4.5 million in 2007. Id. The first $3 million would be
paid in cash after the company's emergence from bankruptcy, and any additional
amounts would be paid in stock of the reorganized company. Id. If all EBITDAR
goals were reached over a three-year period, LTIP bonuses would total $11 million
($5 million in cash) to the six executives. Id.
108 Id.
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By requiring executives to reach EBITDAR benchmarks that
were "difficult targets to reach and [we] re clearly not 'lay-ups' "109
before they became eligible for any bonus payment, Judge
Lifland held that the reformulated compensation plan was an
incentive plan. Reiterating that "a true incentive plan may not
be constrained by 503(c) limitations [and that] merely because a
plan has some retentive effect does not mean that the plan,
overall, is retentive rather than incentivizing in nature,""' Judge
Lifland concluded that the revised compensation plan was not
if it
subject to the § 503(c)(1) prohibition and would be approved
1
was "a fair and reasonable exercise of business judgment." "
12
In re Global Homes Products,LLC'
Global Home Products 113 filed a voluntary petition for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code on April 10, 2006."' As part of its
reorganization, the debtor sought court approval for a
Management Incentive Plan,'15 which awarded each eligible
employee up to four quarterly incentive payments if the debtor
attained either certain minimum EBITDAR or cash flow
benchmarks,1 16 and a Sales Bonus Plan,117 which entitled certain
sales managers to receive up to thirty percent of their annual
base salaries plus a fifteen percent target bonus percentage
payment if the debtor attained l8 either certain minimum
EBITDAR or cash flow benchmarks."
Calculated to achieve certain performance results for the
benefit of the debtor and virtually identical to pre-petition

109 Id. at 583.
110Id. at 571.

Id. at 583.
369 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
113 Global Home Products LLC is a designer and manufacturer of consumer and
specialty products which it markets to retail customers, hospitality customers, and
original equipment manufacturers. Id. at 780.
"I

112

114 Id.
115

Id.

Id. at 780. To be eligible for such bonuses the employee had to be employed
by the debtor on the last day of the particular quarter in which the bonus was being
paid for. Id. at 781. Debtors estimate that this Plan's total cost will range between
$890,000, if the minimum EBITDAR and cash flow objectives are achieved, and $2.7
116

million, if the maximum are achieved. Id.
117 Id. at 779.
118

Id. at 781.
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plans, 119 the proposed compensation plans, the bankruptcy court
concluded, were incentive, not retention, plans.120 Distinguishing
plans whose primary purpose was retention from those whose
primary purpose was motivation with incidental retentive effect,
the court held that the proposed compensation plans were not
prohibited by § 503(c)(1) because "the purpose" of such plans was
not to induce the executive to remain with the debtor through
reorganization.1 2 '
In re Nellson Nutraceutical,Inc. 122
123
On January 28, 2006, Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc.
voluntarily filed under Chapter 11.124
As part of its
reorganization plan, the debtor proposed and sought approval for
an "Ordinary Course Employee Bonus Compensation Program,"
covering about 130 to 140 employees divided into six levels, for
the purpose of "keep[ing] momentum going forward... in both
sales and EBITDA." 125 Under this plan $2.1 million was made
126
available as bonuses if certain levels were achieved.
The debtor, however, failed to achieve the lowest target
EBITDAR set out in the plan, thereby technically prohibiting the
payment of bonuses proposed in the plan. However, with court
approval, the debtor modified the plan to allow for the payment
of the bonuses as if the levels had been achieved. 1 27 The United
States trustee vigorously opposed the court's approval of such
119 Id. at 786. The court inferred from the fact that the proposed compensation
plans were virtually identical to pre-petition compensation plans that retention was
clearly not the primary motive of the proposed plans. Id.
120 Id. "The Court [was] fully satisfied.., that Debtors [weire asking it to

approve incentive, not retention plans ...

."

Id. at 787. Moreover, "[t]he fact... that

all compensation has a retention element d[id] not reduce the Court's conviction that
Debtor's primary goal [was] to create value by motivating performance." Id. at 786.
' Id. at 785-87 ("Section[] 503(c)(1) ... [is] plainly [a] high hurdle[] to clear if
payments are primarily designed for retention. [But tihe entire analysis changes if a
bonus plan is not primarily motivated to retain personnel ...
122 369 B.R. 787 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
12' Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc. and its affiliates are contract manufacturers of
nutritional bars and powders. Id. at 791.
124 Id. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor implemented KERPs for nine
management employees totaling $710,000. Id. Immediately after filing, however, the
debtor replaced the KERPs with a Management Incentive Plan, which linked $1.4
million in bonuses to the achievement of certain EBITDAR performance milestones.
Id. at 791-92. This plan was approved by the court in a prior proceeding. Id. at 792.
121 Id.
at 790-92.
126 Id.
at 792.
127 Id. at 793-97.
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bonuses, arguing that "if an incentive plan is based on
achievement of EBITDA targets and those targets are not
achieved, yet the bonus is still received,.., the plan cannot be an
incentive plan but must, in fact, be solely a retention plan."128
The court disagreed. It determined that the sole or primary
purpose of the Ordinary Course Bonuses was motivation and not
retention, regardless of whether the bonuses were in fact paid
1 29
because the set levels were achieved.
Finding that the bonus plan was not for the primary purpose
of inducing the executives to remain, the court held that
§ 503(c)(1) did not apply. 130 Reasoning that "when the statute's
language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where
the disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it
according to its terms,"' 3' the court concluded that "[a]ny
payment to an employee, including regular wages, has at least a
partial purpose of retaining the employee.
Therefore... all
payments to insiders would be subject to 503(c)(1), which would
be an absurd result."13 2 To avoid such an absurd result, the court
read § 503(c)(1) narrowly as prohibiting only those transfers
33
whose primary purpose was to induce an insider to remain.
D. Keeping a Watchful Eye: Suggestions for a Solution
Section 503(c)(1), which narrowly prohibits the payment of
retention bonuses to executives in reorganization, is an
important first step toward achieving Congress' stated goal of
curbing corporate abuse in bankruptcy, specifically excessive
executive compensation in reorganization. Executives should not
be isolated and protected to such an extent that they need only
agree to stay on with the company through reorganization to be
paid exceedingly generous bonuses. There are important reasons
to keep executives onboard during reorganization-executives
have the institutional knowledge necessary to maximize creditor
12sId. at 803.
129 Id. ("[The Debtor] determined that the 2006 [Ordinary Course Payment]
served its purpose by motivating the employees to do a 'great job'.... As such, the
Debtors seek to award bonuses at a reduced level to compensate the employees for
their success (albeit somewhat limited) in 2006 and to motivate the employees in
2007.").

130 Id. at 801-02.
131Id. at 801.
132

133

Id. at 802.
Id.
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return and the vital client contact necessary to sustain and
improve productive components of the company. Nevertheless,
executives are only truly valuable to a debtor corporation in
reorganization when they put their unique knowledge and skills
to work moving the company toward solvency. An executive,
therefore, should be required to do more than simply remain with
By altogether
the debtor corporation to receive a bonus.
prohibiting the payment of purely retentive bonuses under
§ 503(c)(1), Congress has forced debtor corporations to require
just that. The result-incentive bonus plans.
Incentive bonus plans are a vast improvement over KERPs;
however, if treated in the same exceedingly deferential manner
as pre-BAPCPA KERPs, incentive bonus plans are susceptible to
the same abuse.
For this reason, the bankruptcy courts,
primarily, and Congress, secondarily and only if necessary,
should proactively monitor and regulate incentive bonus plans.
Putting bankruptcy courts at the forefront of regulating the new
breed of executive compensation will allow incentive bonus plans
to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, avoiding the problems
that result from wholesale congressional action.
In regulating incentive bonus plans, the bankruptcy courts
must balance the need to compensate executives in
reorganization with the need to curb abuse. To achieve this
balance, bankruptcy courts should first distinguish among
incentive bonus plans with non-existent performance levels,
plans with terribly low performance levels, and plans with
challenging yet attainable performance levels.
Incentive bonus plans with no specified performance levels
should be re-characterized and treated as KERPs. Similar to the
approach taken by Judge Lifland to Dana's initial executive
compensation plan,14 incentive bonus plans with no specified
performance levels should be categorized as KERPs and
prohibited under § 503(c)(1). Labels cannot and should not be
determinative of character.
Where, however, incentive bonus plans set forth performance
levels, the bankruptcy courts should distinguish between
superficial and meaningful performance levels. To determine
whether performance goals are meaningful or included simply to
avoid § 503(c)(1)'s prohibition, bankruptcy courts should
134 See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
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undertake an independent review of the proposed plans rather
than immediately defer to the business judgment of the debtor.
If a court, after reviewing the debtor's individual circumstances
in reorganization, determines that the goals set forth are in no
way challenging or meaningful, the incentive bonus plan should
be re-categorized as a KERP and prohibited under § 503(c)(1). If,
on the other hand, a court determines that the performance
levels are meaningful, as an added layer of protection, the court
should then further inquire into whether the plan is functioning
as a reward for executive fraud, misconduct, or mismanagement.
As Senator Hatch suggested, "payments where 'misconduct,
fraud, or mismanagement' [are] present" 13 5 should be prohibited.
Such an inquiry will help courts separate the Enrons,
WorldComs, Kmarts, Global Crossings, and Polaroids from the
rest of the corporate world.
The proposal outlined above requires the bankruptcy courts
to act as arbiters rather than overseers when reviewing a debtor
corporation's incentive bonus plan. By taking a more active role
in the review process, bankruptcy courts may be able to curb
abuse of incentive bonus plans where they were previously
unable to with KERPs.
If it becomes necessary for Congress to address incentive
bonus plans, it must take a more nuanced approach than that
taken with KERPs. An outright prohibition would not be an
effective solution. Rather, the legislation must reflect the fine
distinctions set forth above.
"Draining"the Excess: One Judge'sApproach
In January 2008, Judge Robert D. Drain, a federal
bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York
overseeing the Delphi Corporation reorganization, sharply
reduced the corporation's proposed $87 million executive
incentive bonus plan to a mere $16.5 million."3 6 Judge Drain
determined that the amount of the cash award was unreasonably
excessive in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. 3 7
The judge's order came after his careful examination of the terms
E.

135 151 CONG. REC. S2341 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch), 151
Cong Rec S 2306, at *S2341 (LEXIS).
136 Gretchen Morgenson, Royal Pay at Delphi, Reined in by a Judge, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2008, at BUL. Delphi agreed to the reduction. Id.
137

Id.
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of the payouts for approximately one hour and his questioning
the Delphi compensation consultant who devised the plan."'
Judge Drain's pragmatic and thoughtful approach to Delphi's
executive incentive bonus plan illustrates the approach
bankruptcy courts must take to keep incentive bonus plans in
check, in line with the spirit and intent behind § 503(c)(1).
CONCLUSION

Given the narrow statutory language and already existing
precedent in the bankruptcy courts, together with the fact that
"the purpose" of a "true" incentive bonus plan is not to "induc[e]
such person to remain with the debtor's business,"13 9 § 503(c)(1)
cannot be interpreted to prohibit incentive bonus plans. While
the legislative history indicates a clear intent to fashion a farreaching solution to excessive executive compensation in
reorganization, the language of § 503(c)(1) is not elastic enough
to accomplish this goal. If the plights of Enron, WorldCom,
Kmart, Polaroid, and Global Crossing, however, have taught us
anything, it is the necessity of regulation. Therefore, the
bankruptcy courts and, if necessary, Congress, must step in to
rein in incentive bonus plans, the newest breed of executive
compensation in reorganization.

138

Id.

139 11

U.S.C. § 503(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).

